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Symposium on Back-end Sentencing and Parole Reform 
Stanford Law School 





I am honored to be invited to join this Symposium, on both a professional and a personal level.  
First, on a personal level, it is very gratifying to be speaking at a conference organized by 
Elizabeth McBride and Joan Petersilia (admittedly with the help of many others).  Elizabeth was 
one of my closest colleagues at the Urban Institute and the book on prisoner reentry that resulted 
from my four years of work at the Institute in many ways reflects her intellectual, editorial and 
organizational skills.  Joan Petersilia has been my guide and inspiration on the reentry journey, 
starting almost a decade ago.  So to be in the same room with her, continuing our conversation 
on parole and reentry, is a special treat.   
 
On a professional level, I am thrilled beyond words that Stanford Law School has launched this 
examination of “back-end sentencing.”  I coined this phrase several years ago, hoping that the 
provocative use of the word “sentencing” to describe the processes of arrest, adjudication, 
sanctioning and imprisonment for parole violators would challenge scholars and practitioners – 
particularly those in the law professions – to subject these processes to the same scrutiny that is 
applied to all other forms of sentencing.  So I count it as a singular honor that a law school with 
Stanford’s reputation has convened this impressive group to test the power and limits of the 
sentencing framework as applied to parole practices. 
 
Certainly the timing of this symposium is right.  Today, about one third of all admissions to our 
state prisons are individuals being returned on parole violations.  About twenty percent of all 
prisoners held in this state’s prisons are there on parole violations.  The “reentry movement” has 
focused new policy attention on the large number of prisoners returning home, and the need for 
better systems to support their reintegration.  Here in California, the Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger 
litigation is bringing the state’s supervision practices under new scrutiny.  So I hope that, as one 
apparently says in California, that this discussion catches the perfect wave. 
 
We should begin by defining our terms.  I recognize that some may criticize the use of the word 
“sentencing” in the context of parole supervision.  Sentencing, they would say, is the act of 
imposing sanctions for criminal behavior, proven in a court following a trial or plea of guilty.  
What happens in the parole violation context, the critique continues, is merely the continuing 
application of that original sentence.  In other words, the process of adjudicating the violation of 
terms of parole release, including a return to prison in some cases, is part of the original 
sentence.  The defendant knew – and everyone else knew – at the time of sentence that following 
the release from prison, he would be subjected to a term of supervision, with conditions, and 
failure to abide by those conditions could result in a removal from the community and 
deprivation of liberty. 
 
I grant the point that the process of adjudicating parole violations is recognized as flowing from 
the original conviction and sentence.  Stated differently, the only reason that the former prisoner 
is subjected to this process is because of the original conviction and sentence.  But the 
conceptual and operational similarities between the two systems are, to me, so compelling that I 
see every reason – and believe there should be no hesitation – to call the process of adjudicating 
parole violations a form of sentencing. 
 
In both systems, we use the enforcement agencies of the state (police or parole) to detect 
violations of rules (criminal laws or conditions of supervision), arrest and detain those suspected 
of those infractions (defendants or parole violators), bring cases and suspects before a neutral 
adjudicative entity (judge or hearing officer), provide an opportunity for determinations of fact 
through adversarial process (with some distinctions between the systems), determine guilt (with 
differing levels of proof) and impose sanctions for violations of those rules, up to and including 
deprivation of liberty.   
 
To use a colloquial phrase, the parole violation process walks like a duck, looks like a duck, and 
quacks like a duck, so let’s call it a system of sentencing. 
 
What are the benefits and risks of using the sentencing construct in this way, and why has this 
construct not been applied to date? 
 
The answer to the second question, I think, is part and parcel of a related question that lies at the 
core of the work that Joan, Elizabeth and I have done on prisoner reentry, namely, “Why has the 
nation paid so little attention to the realities of reentry – with over 630,000 people leaving state 
and federal prison last year – while paying so much attention to other issues of sentencing 
reform, prison expansion, parole abolition, and related justice policy concerns?”   
 
I have no satisfactory answer to that second question.  We can speculate that the sentencing 
debates of the last generation – regarding mandatory minimums, just desserts, truth in 
sentencing, rehabilitation vs. retribution, selective incapacitation, life without parole, the death 
penalty, determinate vs. indeterminate sentencing – were so engrossing, so hard-fought, so all-
consuming that there was little oxygen left in the air of our discourse on justice to consider the 
deep personal, social, political and jurisprudential consequences of our decisions to significantly 
expand the use of incarceration as our predominant response to criminal behavior. 
 
We can also note our language of sentencing jurisprudence has not given much weight to the 
workings of the back end of our justice system.  For example, we have been taught to use the 
phrases “civil disabilities” or “collateral consequences” to refer to the sanctions that legislatures 
place on individuals convicted of felonies.  This regime of diminished liberty has become quite 
extensive – millions of people in America cannot vote, drive a vehicle, receive food stamps or 
welfare payments, return to their homes in public housing, receive student loans, reunite with 
their children, or even remain in this country because our legislatures have determined to add 
new sanctions to their felony convictions.  I prefer to call these enactments what they are – a 
form of punishment – and, because we have not paid attention to their role in our system of 
sentencing, have called them “invisible punishment.”  So too, we have allowed the system of 
back-end sentencing to become invisible, hidden from public view, difficult to discern in part 
because we do not use the language of punishment, criminal sanctions, and sentencing to 
describe these phenomena.     
 
One could also argue that, as a consequence of our demonization of criminals and our deeper 
impulse to create distinctions between “us” and “them,” we neglected to consider the individuals 
affected by our justice system, and therefore lost sight of the fact that we had more than 
quadrupled the rate of incarceration in this country, with all the ripple effects upon prisoners, 
their families and their communities.  We put them not only out of sight – in far-away prisons – 
but we put them out of mind. 
 
Just as we neglected, for whatever reason, to consider what I have called “the iron law of 
imprisonment” – with the rare exceptions of people who die in prison, they all come back – so 
too we neglected to pay sufficient attention to the profound changes in the way that the parole 
system was managed, how it responded to the same get-tough impulses affecting every other 
aspect of our criminal justice policy, and the relationship between parole revocations and the 
growth of our prison system.  For years, Joan Petersilia was perhaps the lone scholar conducting 
serious research on this topic.  Now we can say that she has been joined by dozens of others, but 
we have a lot of lost ground to recover. 
 
Had we kept the back-end of our criminal justice system at the front of our sentencing 
discussions over the past generation – had we considered the parole violation process a form of 
sentencing – we would have systematically subjected this form of sentencing to the robust and 
sometimes raucous debates of this era.  Allow me to suggest three sentencing constructs that 
should be applied to the practice of back-end sentencing. 
 
First, I think we should apply the fundamental justice principle that “like cases should be treated 
alike.”  This principle animated a sustained critique of the system of indeterminate sentencing, a 
critique which found political acceptance in California’s adoption of a determinate sentencing 
system in 1976.  How could a system of sentencing, it was argued, be considered just if two 
defendants, facing similar charges and with similar backgrounds and criminal records, receive 
significantly different sentences, depending on the judge imposing the sentence?  A parallel 
critique was leveled at the system of parole release.  Critics pointed out that the decision to 
release a prisoner on parole varied according to the composition of the parole board, the state of 
overcrowding of the prisons, or other extraneous factors, thereby violating the fundamental 
principle that like cases be treated alike.  This principle also energized a critique of our 
sentencing practices as being racially discriminatory.  Research showing that defendants of color 
received harsher sentences – and were less likely to be released on parole – fueled the attacks on 
indeterminate sentencing.   
 
If the equal treatment principle were applied to back-end sentencing, we would first want to 
know empirically whether the current system treats like cases alike.  We would collect data, on a 
regular basis, showing the dispositions of parole violations according to the characteristics of 
parolees, the severity of the underlying offense, and the prior record of the parolee, including the 
record of previous parole violations.  To complete the analogy, I will assume for argument 
purposes that this analysis would show variations in sanctions that could not be easily reconciled 
with the justice mandate of the equal treatment principle.  I believe this is a reasonable 
assumption, based on research conducted here in California and elsewhere, but the troubling 
point is that we simply do not know the answer to this question today. 
 Assuming we find unequal treatment in back-end sanctions, we would then borrow a page from 
the history of front-end sentencing reform.  We would ask what steps should be taken to reduce 
the disparities.  The legislature could intervene to establish criteria for parole violation and 
revocations, as has been the case in sentencing policy around the country.  Or the legislature 
could empower sentencing commissions to create sentencing grids for sanctions for parole 
violations, with allowances for upward and downward departures from those guidelines.  Or the 
executive branch, which oversees most parole systems, could develop these guidelines, following 
a period of notice and comment consistent with administrative rule-making.  Or, in more extreme 
cases, the judicial branch might find that some back-end sanctions violate constitutional or 
statutory protections and require or impose corrective measures.  The basic point is that the 
branches of government responsible for overseeing the exercise of the profound power to deprive 
individuals of their liberty should step in to ensure that the system itself operates in ways 
consistent with notions of equal treatment. 
 
Second, I believe we should apply “just desserts” principles to the practices of back-end 
sentencing.  Under these principles, a criminal sanction is deemed appropriate, or legitimate, if 
the severity of the sanction reaffirms the social norms underlying the creation of the crime itself.  
In other words, the “just desserts” principle is violated if a murderer is punished less severely 
than a burglar.  The legislative decision to designate murder as a more severe crime than 
burglary is devalued if the criminal justice system is allowed to punish the former more leniently 
than the latter.   Application of this principle to justice reform efforts over the past thirty years 
has resulted in greater degrees of legislative specification of criminal sentences, such as 
mandatory minimums, so that the judicial branch had greater difficulty meting out sentences that 
could be seen as diminishing the severity of the offense. 
 
If we were to apply this principle to back-end sentencing, we would, once again, begin by 
conducting some empirical research to determine the sanctions applied to different violations of 
social norms.  In carrying out this exercise, we would quickly confront one of the underlying 
tensions in this policy arena, namely the blurred distinction between parole violations for 
technical offenses and those for new crimes.  In some states we would find, as Sarah Lawrence 
and I did when we published our analysis of parole revocations in California, that prison 
sentences imposed for relatively minor parole violations, such as failed drug tests, are not 
substantially shorter than sentences imposed for parole violations where the underlying 
misconduct was recorded as murder, rape, and assault. 
 
In a moment I will offer some thoughts on how to handle parole violations for new crimes, so 
would now like to focus attention on the “just desserts” question regarding parole revocations for 
technical violations.  Perhaps it is appropriate to send someone back to prison for four months 
for a failed drug test, as Sarah Lawrence and I found in California.  An argument supporting this 
deprivation of liberty would be stronger if this sanction were reserved for those determined to be 
recalcitrant, who had consistently engaged in drug use after trying a series of progressively 
restrictive alternatives.  This policy would be considered more legitimate if there were research 
demonstrating that this new prison sentence was positively correlated with reductions in criminal 
behavior and drug use.   
 
I would personally be very skeptical about such a policy.  But my personal view is less important 
than the larger policy point that we should engage in a debate, backed up by empirical research 
and reflecting sound sentencing principles, before we authorize the exercise of state power as is 
now the case in sanctions for parole violations.   
 
Third, I believe we should apply the principles of “truth-in-sentencing” to the system of back-
end sentencing.  One can view the “truth-in-sentencing” movement that swept the country in the 
late 1980s as simply a stalking horse for the get-tough-on-crime agenda of the conservative wing 
of the crime policy debates.  Setting this critique aside, however, there is an important kernel in 
this rhetoric that we should cultivate.  In language borrowed from earlier critiques of 
indeterminate sentencing, proponents of “truth-in-sentencing” argued for greater transparency in 
sentencing practices, greater certainty in outcomes, and public accountability for matching 
rhetoric with practice.  Public confidence in our system of justice is undermined, the argument 
went, whenever the system operated in the dark and decisions were not subject to public 
scrutiny. 
 
The system of back-end sentencing is hidden from public view.  Who knows the rules of this 
particular game?  Do our legislatures know the punishments meted out for various parole 
violations?  Is a parolee told that certain infractions will result in designated punishments, so that 
he can modify his behavior accordingly and, if sanctioned, can’t say, “no one told me this might 
happen.”  The establishment of a sentencing grid – whether by the legislature, a sentencing 
commission, or the executive branch – would at least provide for public accountability and fair 
notice to parolees, their families and their advocates. 
 The application of “truth-in-sentencing” principles to back-end sentencing would also expose, 
for public debate, the practice of sending parolees back to prison for new crimes.  I am deeply 
troubled by this practice.  As mentioned earlier, in our analysis of parole revocations in 
California, Sarah Lawrence and I found cases involving murder, rape and robbery that were 
treated as parole violations and resulted in returns to prison.  California is certainly not alone in 
this practice – nearly a third of all returns to prison for parole violations in 2000 were for new 
crimes.  But the California analysis highlighted, for me, the problems with this aspect of back-
end sentencing.  The murder cases in our analysis received an average of x months in prison, the 
rape cases y months.   
 
Where was the public outcry about these cases?  Where were the victims groups, demanding that 
these crimes be taken seriously?  Where were the survivors of these rapes and families of the 
homicide victims, picketing the offices of criminal justice leaders wanting to know how they 
could devalue the lives that had been damaged or lost?  The hidden world of back-end sentencing 
has allowed the justice system to escape accountability – an ironic result in an era when public 
outrage, media excess, and political attention have brought every other aspect of justice policy 
into the blinding glare of public scrutiny.    
 
Again, I have my preferred solution to the dilemma of technical vs. new crime parole violations.  
I argue in my book that the two should be decoupled, and new crimes should be prosecuted as 
new crimes, with possible penalty enhancements to recognize that repeated offenses should be 
treated more severely.  But the larger point is that we should have this debate in public, before 
legislative committees, sentencing commissions, or rule-making entities such as parole boards, 
so that our system of justice is firmly rooted in a legitimate political process, rather than carried 
out in the back rooms of our prisons and parole agencies. 
 
In closing, let me applaud the Criminal Justice Center of Stanford Law School for sponsoring 
this important and timely discussion.  I hope that this prestigious law school can, through its 
faculty, students and publications, begin a movement to engage the worlds of legal scholarship 
and legal practice in a robust debate on the jurisprudence of back-end sentencing.  Others are 
taking up the challenge – journalists, legislative committees, sentencing commissions, parole 
boards, advocacy groups – but we need legal scholars and practitioners to provide the theoretical 
frameworks that will help us find the way out of a very dark forest.   
 
Thank you. 
 
 
 
 
